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CASENOTES 
Labor  Law-REVERSE POLITICAL CHECKOFF PER SE ILLEGAL AS 
VIOLATION OF FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT, 2 U.S.C. 5 
441bFederal  Election Commission u. National Education As- 
sociation, 457 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, 
No. 79-1077 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 1979). 
C 
The National Education Association (NEA), a voluntary 
professional educators association,' maintains a Political Action 
Committee (NEA-PAC) for the support of political candidates 
and issues. In the past three congressional campaigns, NEA- 
PAC has contributed more than one million dollars to candi- 
d a t e ~ . ~  In 1976, the National Right to Work Committee filed a 
complaint with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) alleging 
that the NEA's funding procedure-a "reverse checkofYS in 
which members objecting to the NEA's politics must request a 
refund of their annual one dollar political contribution-violated 
the rights of dissenting NEA members.' The NEA's Representa- 
tive Assembly had approved the reverse checkoff procedure for 
both dues collection and the funding of NEA-PAC.' Ruling on 
cross motions for summary judgment by the FEC and the NEA, 
the district court for the District of Columbia held that the NEA 
had violated 2 U.S.C. 5 441b(b)(3)(A)6 because the reverse 
checkoff procedure placed the burden of dissenting from the po- 
litical contribution upon the individual association member? 
1. The NEA was recently found to be a labor organization for purposes of the 
Ladrum-Griffin Act. National Educ. Ass'n v. Marshall, 85 Lab. Cas. ll 11,172 (D.D.C. 
1979). See also [I9791 800 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 23-24. 
2. [I9781 787 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 10. 
3. In a checkoff arrangement, employers deduct an employee's union dues from his 
wages and forward them directly to the union. GUIDEBOOK TO LABOR ELATIONS (CCH) 7 
308 (1979). In a reverse checkoff system, dues or fees are deducted from an employee's 
wages unless he indicates otherwise. The checkoff is a widespread union practice. J. 
STIEBER, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONISM: STRUCTURE, GROWTH, POLICY 131 (1973). See also 
D. SULLIVAN, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR LAW 8 16.6 (1969). 
4. [I9781 771 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 16-17. 
5. Approximately 10,000 delegates attended the Representative Assembly. Federal 
Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102, 1103, appeal docketed, No. 
79-1077 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 1979). 
6. 2 U.S.C. 5 441b(b)(3)(A) (1976). 
7. 457 F. Supp. at 1106. 
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The court subsequently ordered the NEA to again solicit the 
contributions for the 1974-75, 1975-76, and 1976-77 member- 
ships years. Any member not affirmatively indicating a desire to 
have contributed during those years was to have his pro rata po- 
litical contribution refunded? 
Federal labor laws provide a pervasive structure for the ac- 
tivities of labor unrons; virtually every facet of the labor move- 
ment is monitored, and the rights of labor unions expand or con- 
tract with statutory enactments. Because union rights are 
generally conferred by statute, labor has a vested interest in the 
political process. Yet Congress has limited union activities in the 
very arena in which labor has one of its greatest interests. As 
might be expected, this tension between government regulation 
and labor union activity transforms the simplest union policies 
into questions of political and constitutional significance. 
While Congress and the courts have long concerned them- 
selves with the solicitation and spending procedures of unions, 
the resulting legislation has centered on two areas: regulating 
campaign expenditures and giving unions the ability to raise 
funds for their causes. Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley 
Act-later section 610 of title 18-regulated union expenditures 
in political campaigns.@ Section 610 made it "unlawful . . . for 
any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make 
a contribution or expenditure in connection with any [fed- 
eral] election."1° Congress' primary concern in enacting section 
610 was " 'the necessity for destroying the influence over elec- 
tions which corporations [and unions] exercised through 
financial contributions' ";I1 a secondary purpose was to protect 
union members from the use of their involuntary contributions 
for union political activities.12 Section 152 (Eleventh) of the 
Railway Labor Act,lS unlike section 610 which was a criminal 
8. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 99 L.R.R.M. 3463 (D.D.C. 
1978). 
9. 18 U.S.C. 5 610 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) 
(1976)). Section 610 derived from section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. 
L. No. 68-506, 8 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074 (1925). 
10. 18 U.S.C. 8 610 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
11. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80 (1975) (quoting United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 
113 (1948)). 
12. Id. at 81 & n.13. 
13. Railway Labor Act 5 2, 45 U.S.C. 8 152 (Eleventh) (1976). 
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statute," is a permissive statute conferring on unions a union- or 
agency-shop privilege. Concomitant to the union-security privi- 
lege, the statute authorized a checkoff procedure for dues collec- 
tion." Congress gave unions the power to raise funds to "[effec- 
tuate] the basic congressional policy of stabilizing labor relations 
in the industry."16 Through union-security agreements, the un- 
ions could eliminate "free-riders9'-those who would enjoy the 
benefits of union membership without contributing their fair 
share of the costd7 
In 1976 Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign 
Act18 and codified new limitations on union and corporate politi- 
cal spending? Section 441b of the Federal Election Campaign 
Act replaced section 610 and contained language virtually iden- 
tical to that found in section 152 (Eleventh) of the Railway La- 
14. Section 610 provides for fines of up to $5,000 for any corporate or labor union 
violation of the act. Officers or directors of the organizations may be fined up to $1,000 
and imprisoned for up to one year; willful violators may be fined up to $10,000 and 
imprisoned for up to two years. 18 U.S.C. 3 610 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). No private cause 
of action exists under section 610. Cort v. Ash, 422 US. 66 (1975). 
15. Section 152 (Eleventh) reads in part as follows: 
[A] labor organization . . . shall be permitted- 
. . . .  
(b) to make agreements providing for the deduction by such carrier . . . 
from the wages of its . . . employees in a craft or class and payment to the 
labor organization representing the craft or class of such employees, of any 
periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments . . . uniformly required as a 
condition of acquiring or retaining membership . . . . 
45 U.S.C. 3 152 (Eleventh) (1976). 
16. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760 (1961). See also 
Nolan, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Defining the Federal Role, 63 CORNELL . 
REV. 419, 456 (1978). 
17. 367 U.S. at 761. 
18. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 3 112, 
90 Stat. 490 (1976). 
19. The portion of the statute relevant here states the following: 
It  is unlawful for . . . any labor organization, to make a contribution or 
expenditure in connection with any [federal] election . . . or in connection 
with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select can- 
didates . . . . 
. . . .  
It shall be unlawful- 
for . . . a [separate segregated fund utilized by a labor organization for 
political purposes] to make a contribution or expenditure by utilizing money or 
anything of value secured by . . . dues, fees, or other moneys required as a 
condition of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of employ- 
ment .  . . . 
2 U.S.C. 3 441b(a), (b)(3)(A). For an analysis of section 441b, see Comment, Corporate 
and Union Political Contributions and Expenditures Under 2 U.S.C. $ 441 b: A Consti- 
tutional Analysis, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 291. 
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bor Act. Despite the fact that a union's political activities extend 
from the collection of contributions to the expenditure of those 
funds in a political campaign, the court decisions based on sec- 
tion 610 are remarkably distinct from section 152 (Eleventh) de- 
c i s i o n ~ . ~ ~  The potential conflict between the two lines of deci- 
sions and the effect the resolution of this conflict will have on 
section 441b necessitates a review not only of the major cases 
under section 610 and section 152 (Eleventh), but also a review 
of the constitutional principles circumscribing the statutes. 
A. Section 610 and Minority Interests 
1. The influence of union political expenditures: CIO and 
UAW 
The first test of the campaign expenditure limitations of the ' 
Taft-Hartley Act came shortly after passage of the Act in 
United States u. CIO." Phillip Murray, President of the Con- 
gress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), had openly endorsed a 
candidate for Congress in the union's newspaper. The Supreme 
Court held in favor of the union and found that financial sup- 
port of a regularly published union newspaper did not fall 
within the statute's "contribution or expenditure" language, and 
that the union could therefore use general union funds for intra- 
union political purposes.a2 
In a concurring opinion, four justices found that the statute 
was overbroad and infringed on first amendment rights." The 
concurring justices granted that one of the reasons for the stat- 
ute was to protect the political interests of minority union mem- 
bers, but reasoned that a statute so broad as to prohibit all po- 
litical expenditures encroached on the majority's rights." This 
would "deprive the union of the principle of majority rule in po- 
litical expre~sion."~~ Less restrictive measures were available to 
20. Comment, Of  Politics, Pipefitters, and Section 610: Union Political Contribu- 
tions in Modern Context, 51 TEX. L. REV. 936, 955 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Politics 
and Pipefitters]. 
21. 335 U.S. 106 (1948). 
22. Id. at 123-24. No statutes or cases since CIO have dealt with whether any limita- 
tions exist on internal union expenditures for the promotion of a union political action 
committee. See generally Comment, Federal Regulation of Union Political Expendi- 
tures: New Wine in Old Bottles, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 100, 127. 
23. 335 U S .  at 150-51 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
24. Id. at 146-48. 
25. Id. at 149. 
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protect the minority's rights.26 
Almost a decade after CIO, the Court in United States v. 
UAW2' again ruled on section 610, and again the majority side- 
stepped the main issues. The indictment stated that the United 
Auto Workers (UAW) had paid for a television broadcast sup- 
porting certain congressional candidates. The district court dis- 
missed the indictment for having failed to state an offense under 
the statute. Reciting the statute's legislative history, the Su- 
preme Court reversed, holding that the indictment stated a stat- 
utory cause of action because the UAW might have used general 
funds to finance extra-union political activities. The Court de- 
clined to discuss the constitutional issues, but noted that the 
"case . . . raise[d] issues not less than basic to a democratic 
Justice Douglas, Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Black 
dissented on the ground that the statute abridged freedom of 
speech by limiting the union's participation in political activi- 
ties." With regard to protecting minority rights, the dissent rea- 
soned along the same lines as the concurrence in CIO, stating 
that "[ilf minorities need protection against the use of union 
funds for political speech-making, there are ways of reaching 
that end without denying the majority their First Amendment 
rights. 
2. The source of union political funds: Pipefitters and Boyle 
In contrast to CIO and UAW, which dealt with the nature 
26. Justice Rutledge wrote the following: 
If merely "minority or dissenter protection" were intended, it would be 
sufficient for securing this to permit the dissenting members to carry the bur- 
den of making known their position and to relieve them of any duty to pay 
dues or portions of them to be applied to the forbidden uses without jeopardy 
to their rights as members. This would be clearly sufficient . . . to protect dis- 
senting members against use of funds contributed by them for purposes they 
disapprove, but would not deprive the union of the right to use the funds of 
concurring members . . . without securing their express consent in advance of 
the use. 
Id. 
27. 352 U.S. 567 (1957). 
28. Id. at 570. One of the questions the Court suggested might have a bearing on the 
outcome of the trial was whether the UAW paid for the broadcast out of general union 
funds or funds "fairly said to have been obtained on a voluntary basis." Id. 
29. Id. at 594-98 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
30. Id. at 597. The dissent criticized the limitation placed on majority rights as a 
result of minority objections, equating the approach to "burning down the house to roast 
the pig." Id. at 596. In a footnote, Justice Douglas proposed the English system as an 
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of unlawful union political expenditures, Pipefitters Local 562 v. 
United Statess1 dealt with the way in which the union collected 
funds for admittedly lawful political expenditures. Officials of 
Pipefitters Local 562 were convicted of conspiracy to violate sec- 
tion 610 for receiving union member payments that were fun- 
neled into a separate union fund and then disbursed to candi- 
dates. Union members had testified at trial that the 
contributions were expected just as were dues and other fees." 
The Supreme Court noted from the outset that based on its 
legislative history "[section] 610 . . . does not prohibit a labor 
organization from making, through the medium of a political 
fund organized by it, contributions or expenditures in connec- 
tion with federal elections, so long as the monies expended are 
in some sense volunteered by those asked to contr ib~te ."~~ The 
issue thus framed was whether the contributions were "knowing 
free-choice  donation^."'^ Once again the Court was concerned 
about protecting the dissenting member. 
The Court found that the union could control the fund,s5 
but could only receive political contributions under circum- 
stances plainly indicating to the individual member that (1) the 
contribution was for political purposes, and (2) he might decline 
without jeopardizing his union member~hip .~~ The Court re- 
versed the conviction and remanded with instructions to deter- 
mine whether the political funds were voluntary donations or 
alternative. In that system "[tlhe protection of minority union members from the use of 
their funds in supporting a cause with which they do not sympathize may be cured by 
permitting the minority to withdraw their funds from that activity." Id. a t  597 n.1. 
31. 407 U.S. 385 (1972). 
32. Id. at 393. 
33. Id. at 401. 
34. Id. a t  414. 
35. Id. a t  439. Justice Powell dissented vigorously. He characterized the issue as 
"whether the political fund of Local 562 was in reality a sham or subterfuge through 
which the union itself made the contributions fobidden by the statute." Id. at 446-47. 
Concerning the result reached by the majority he said the following: 
By refusing to affirm the judgment below, the majority renders the ulti- 
mate fate of this litigation uncertain. If, on remand, the[se] techniques . . . 
should be sanctioned, other unions and corporations could easily follow . . . 
and obtain from members, employees, and shareholders a consent form attest- 
ing that the contribution (or withholding) is "voluntary." The trappings of vol- 
untariness might be achieved while the substance of coercion remained. Union 
members and corporate employees might find themselves the objects of regular 
and systematized solicitation by the very agent which exercises direct control 
over their jobs and livelihood. 
Id. at 449. 
36. Id. a t  414-15. 
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"contributions effectively assessed."37 
Shortly after Pipefitters, the issue of the "voluntariness" of 
contributions was again raised in United States u. B ~ y l e . ~ ~  
Boyle, a former president of the United Mine Workers (UMW), 
was convicted of thirteen counts of unlawful campaign contribu- 
tions under 18 U.S.C. § 610 and of unlawful conversion of union 
funds and conspiracy. sdyle had authorized payments from 
UMW general funds to the union's political arm, Labor's Non- 
Partisan League, and from the League to candidates for federal 
office. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Co- 
lumbia Circuit, Boyle claimed that the government had neither 
shown that the funds used were involuntary contributions, nor 
that section 610 was unconstitutional-a question reserved in 
pipe fitter^.^^ 
Rejecting the first claim, the circuit court found that the 
"clear intent of 5 610 . . . [was] to permit expenditures from 
separate, segregated funds if the contributions to it were, in 
truth, voluntary, and to prohibit expenditures from a union's 
general treasury. . . . Congress intended to protect individual 
union members against both overtly coerced and unknown con- 
tributions; each is equally inv~luntary."~~ On the constitutional 
claim, the court found that the statute did not, as the defendant 
contended, impinge on first amendment rights by limiting union 
contributions to political campaigns. Rather, union political or- 
ganizations might contribute "any amount'"' provided the mon- 
ies were not raised through union dues and assessments. This 
provision protected minority interests by requiring that the 
funds be voluntary; section 610 was viewed as requiring a "con- 
tracting in" system where "assenting members [must] 'give af- 
firmative evidence of such approval' by assenting to having a de- 
duction made from the member's pay check."42 Therefore, the 
majority could not compel the minority to subsidize majority po- 
litical views. The Supreme Court denied review of the de~ision.'~ 
The Boyle view that section 610 adopted a system of "con- 
37. Id. at 422. 
38. 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973). 
39. 407 U.S. at 400. 
40. 482 F.2d at 761-62 (emphasis in original). 
41. Id. at 763 (emphasis in original). 
42. Id. at 764. In a "contracting in" system, a member must affirmatively assent to 
any contribution. In a "contracting out" system, a member must assert his refusal to 
make the contribution. Id. at 763-64. 
43. Boyle v. United States, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973). 
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tracting in" was clearly a new gloss on CIO, UAW, and Pipefit- 
ters. The Boyle court moved beyond the implicit holding of 
UAW that political funds could not come from general union 
dues, and even beyond the Pipefitters holding that political 
funds must not be a condition for union membership; the Boyle 
decision required that members give affirmative evidence of 
their willing contribution-a requirement not found in either 
UAW or Pipefitters and not explicit in the language of the 
statute.44 
B. Union Security and Section 152 (Eleventh) 
One of the reasons Congress authorized the union shop was 
to eliminate the "free-rider" problem. Unless unions could re- 
quire fair contributions from all beneficiaries of the unions' col- 
lective-bargaining efforts, some members might not pay and 
would thereby ride the financial coattails of the rest. The union- 
or agency-shop assessment is the fair cost to each employee of 
the expense of collective bargaining-the value of which is pre- 
sumably returned in the form of employee benefits and wages. 
Section 152 (Eleventh) of the Railway Labor Act prescribes the 
conditions under which a union may maintain a union shop and 
a checkoff.45 
One of the first cases to deal with union security under 
secton 152 was Railway Employes' Department u. H ~ n s o n . ~ ~  In 
Hanson a railroad employee claimed, among other things, that 
the union-shop provision violated the first amendment right of 
association. Justice Douglas found that Congress had the power 
to enact a union-shop measure, and that the decision to do so 
was "an allowable one."" While the Court ruled that the union 
shop did not violate the right of association, the Court declined 
44. "Section 610 wholly fails to specify what funds a labor organization is barred 
from contributing or expending in connection with a federal election." Pipefitters Local 
562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 401 n.12 (1972). 
45. A union shop requires that the employee join the union either before or after 
being hired. In an agency shop, nonunion employees must either join the union or pay a 
service fee equivalent to membership fees, dues, and assessments. GUIDEBOOK TO LABOR 
REALTIONS (CCH) 1 308 (1979). 
"The context in which the difference between a union shop and an agency shop is of 
'great importance' is in delimiting the union's power to discipline employees for breach 
of the union's internal rules." Haggard, A Clarification of the Types of Union Security 
Agreements Affirmatiuely Permitted by Federal Statutes, 5 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 418, 426 
(1974). 
46. 351 U.S. 225 (1956). 
47. Id. at  233. 
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to comment on potential violations of the right of expre~s ion .~~ 
Five years after Hanson, the Supreme Court in Interna- 
tional Association of Machinists u. S t ~ e e t ' ~  faced "questions of 
the utmost gravity."'O In Street railroad employees protested 
the compulsory nature of the union shop, claiming that union 
monies, required as a condition of employment, were used to 
finance campaigns of political candidates. After a lengthy review 
of union security in the railway industry,'l the Court construed 
the statute "to deny the unions, over an employee's objection, 
the power to use his exacted funds to support political causes 
which he opposes."52 
The Court remanded the case to the Georgia courts to fash- 
ion the appropriate remedy. Some guidelines, however, were pro- 
vided in the Court's opinion. First, the Court emphasized that 
the courts should strive to "attain the appropriate reconciliation 
between majority and dissenting interests in the area of political 
expres~ion."'~ Safeguards were found within the Act for the pro- 
tection of both interests, and neither interest was to work to the 
exclusion of the other? Second, in providing a remedy, the 
court was not to presume that dissent existed?' Though monies 
might still be exacted from employees not affirmatively indicat- 
ing their dissent, the court and the union were to devise some 
method to insure that the union did not use the dissenters' 
48. The Court said the following: 
If other conditions [other than 'periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments'] 
are in fact imposed, or if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is 
used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contraven- 
tion of the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the decision in 
that case. 
Id. at 238. 
49. 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
50. Id. at  749. 
51. Id. at  750-64. Even under the union-security provision, the Court noted that "a 
union's status as exclusive bargaining representative carries with it the duty fairly and 
equitably to represent all employees of the craft or class, union and nonunion." Id. a t  
761 (citations omitted). 
52. Id. at  768-69. The question of whether a union could expend, over the objection 
of an employee, funds for activities other than collective-bargaining agreements was not 
decided. Id. Nor did any party contend that the expenditures violated Q 610. Id. at  773 
n.21. 
53. Id. at  773. 
54. Id. at  767-68. 
55. Id. at  774. The court will not hear claims of dissent by union members after they 
have been discharged if they had an opportunity to dissent while employed. Hostetler v. 
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 294 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 955 
(1962). 
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funds for the objectionable purposes.56 
Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks v. Allens7 
involved facts almost identical to those in Street. In Allen, how- 
ever, the union demanded that a dissenting member indicate 
each expenditure to which he objected. The Court held that no 
dissenting employee may be required to specify .the objectiona- 
ble expenditures. Rather, the dissenter merely had to inform the 
union that he objected to any of the political expenditures," 
since to require more would place an impracticable burden on 
the employee, particularly where only the union had a record of 
the political  expenditure^.'^ 
Allen is authority for two other significant points. For the 
first time in a case involving the Railway Labor Act union secur- 
ity provision, the Court suggested that unions had a right to ex- 
pend nondissenters' funds on political activities. Whereas in 
Street the Court had spoken of balancing dissenter and union 
interests, the Court in Allen described union political activity as 
a right and not merely as a historical union function.60 In addi- 
tion, the Court formulated a remedy and recommended that the 
union refund the dissenting employees' share of the expended 
funds as well as reduce all future exactions by the amount of the 
political  contribution^.^^ 
In interpreting the statutory provisions of the Railway La- 
bor Act applicable in Hanson, Street, and Allen, the Court de- 
lineated certain rights and privileges as constitutionally permis- 
sible: (1) the union shop is a permissible means of maintaining 
union security and does not prejudice any union member's right 
of association, (2) political conformity, under the guise of union 
security, may not be required over a union member's objection, 
and (3) a dissenting member's objections, though not presumed, 
need not be specified. 
56. The Court suggested (1) an injunction against the expenditure of funds in pro- 
portion to the contribution of the dissenting employees to the political fund, of (2) a 
rebate to the dissenters. 367 U.S. at 774-75. 
57. 373 U.S. 113 (1963). 
58. Id. at 118. 
59. Id. at 122. The Court placed the burden on the party with easiest access to the 
information. 
60. The Court stated that "no decree would be proper which appeared likely to in- 
fringe the unions' right to expend uniform exactions under the union-shop agreement in 
support of activities germane to collective bargaining and, as well, to expend nondis- 
senters' such exactions in support of political activities." Id. 
61. Id. 
CASENOTES 
C. Union Security and the Constitution 
The Supreme Court largely resolved the section 610 and 
section 152 cases without resorting to careful constitutional 
analysis. Up to and including the Pipefitters decision in 1972, 
the Supreme Court conscientiously avoided delineating the con- 
stitutional rights of individual union members with respect to 
union political contributions. In fact the constitutionality of sec- 
tion 610-now section 441b-has never been challenged in the 
Supreme Court,62 and in Boyle the court of appeals only dealt 
briefly with the issue? In both CIO and UAW, the Court re- 
fused to adjudicate the constitutional merits of the claims. In 
both cases, a minority-four justices in CIO and three in 
UAW-not only thought the Court should decide the constitu- 
tional issue but questioned the validity of the statute if protect- 
ing the minority members meant denying the union majority its 
first amendment rights. The Hanson Court found that the 
union-shop provision of section 152 did not violate the right of 
association, but the Court did not decide whether it violated the 
right of free speech. Allen suggested that the union shop did not 
violate the right of association, and that the union itself might 
even have a constitutional right to engage in political activity. 
Against this panoply of constitutional intimations, the Su- 
preme Court decided Abood v. Detroit Board of Education" and 
thrust itself into the fray between individual and collective 
rights. After its certification as bargaining agent in 1967, the De- 
troit Federation of Teachers secured a collective-bargaining 
agreement that included an agency-shop p r o v i s i ~ n . ~ ~  Abood, 
along with other teachers in the Detroit school system, com- 
plained that the union had used service fees and dues for activi- 
ties unrelated to collective bargaining? The teachers sought to 
have the agency-shop provision declared invalid under Michigan 
law and unconstitutional as a violation of the right of 
as~ociation.~~ 
62. Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 400 (1972); United States v. 
UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 592 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 124 (1948). 
63. Cf. United States v. Chestnut, 394 F. Supp. 581,588, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ($ 610 
was neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad). 
64. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
65. The provision required that nonunion teachers, within 60 days of hire, join the 
union or pay a service fee equal to the union dues. Id. at 212. 
66. The service fee was a condition of employment and those refusing to pay it were 
subject to discharge. Id. at 212. 
67. Id. at 213. 
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Relying on Hanson, the Michigan Court of Appeals had up- 
held the validity of the agency-shop clause. The court, however, 
had also held that the union could not make expenditures unre- 
lated to collective bargaining over an employee's objections; 
moreover, the employee had to "make known to the union those 
causes and candidates to which he objects."68 The United States 
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdi~tion.~~ 
In argument before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs tried 
to distinguish Hanson on the grounds that it only involved pri- 
vate sector employees, whereas in Abood the teachers were gov- 
ernment employees. The plaintiffs argued, therefore, that they 
were entitled to greater constitutional guarantees.?O Plaintiffs 
also contended that collective bargaining in the public sector 
was itself such a politically entangled process that to require 
union membership was to require "ideological ~onformity."~' 
The Court rejected both arguments. First, the Hanson rationale 
applied "not because there was no governmental action, but be- 
cause there was no First Amendment ~ io la t ion ."~~ Second, the 
Court found that a public sector agency shop was constitution- 
ally permissible and, therefore, a legislative determinati~n.?~ 
In holding that the agency shop was permissible, the Court 
reaffirmed that the union could finance noncollective-bargaining 
activities from the contributions of members: "We do not hold 
that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the expres- 
sion of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or to- 
ward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane 
to its duties as collective-bargaining repre~entative."~' Although 
the union can support its causes through the contributions of 
some members, the Court held that the union could not compel 
support for noncollective-bargaining causes from all members: 
68. 60 Mich. App. 92, 102, 230 N.W.2d 322, 327 (1975). 
69. 425 U.S. 949 (1976). 
70. 431 U.S. a t  226, 227 & n.23. 
71. Id. a t  226. 
72. Id. In fact, in Hanson, the enactment of the federal statute was the government 
action. Id. a t  218 n.12. 
73. The Court reasoned as follows: 
[Michigan] has determined that labor stability will be served by a system of 
exclusive representation and the permissive use of an agency shop in public 
employment. . . . [Tlhere can be no principled basis for according that deci- 
sion less weight in the constitutional balance than was given in Hanson to the 
congressional judgment reflected in the Railway Labor Act. 
Id. a t  229. 
74. Id. a t  235. 
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"[Tlhe Constitution requires . . . that such expenditures be 
financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees 
who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not co- 
erced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of gov- 
ernmental empl~yrnent."~~ Consistent with Allen, the Court fur- 
ther held that objecting employees need not specify their 
objections. On this point the Court reversed and remanded the 
case to the Michigan courts.78 
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment77 but criticized 
the majority, contending they had not required the state to 
prove overriding state interests as a defense to a first amend- 
ment claim.78 He reasoned that since a dissenting union mem- 
ber's views are p r ~ t e c t e d , ~ ~  to permit a union to exact fees puts 
the burden of litigaton on the dissenter. Proper placement of the 
burden would "require the State [employer] to come forward 
and demonstrate, as to each union expenditure for which it 
would exact support from minority employees, that the com- 
pelled contribution is necessary to serve overriding governmen- 
tal obje~tives."~~ This burden would protect the minority's views 
but would not impede the overriding interests of the state. 
In large measure, Abood adopted as a constitutional stan- 
dard the statutory standard enunciated in Hanson, Street, and 
Allen: union-security clauses are permissible under the Consti- 
tution provided that no objecting employee is compelled to con- 
tribute to causes unrelated to collective bargaining. By acknowl- 
edging that union-security provisions are permissible, the Court 
did not raise the provisions to the status of a union right,8l thus 
leaving open the question of the effect of section 610 on a union 
or agency shop founded on section 152 or Abood. Since that 
75. Id. a t  235-36. 
76. Id. at  241-42. 
77. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Jus- 
tices Stevens and Rehnquist wrote brief concurring opinions. 
78. Id. at  262 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 US. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
79. See Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 
U.S. 167 (1976) (commission could not prohibit nonunion teacher from speaking a t  pub- 
lic school board meeting on pending collective bargaining negotiations). 
80. 431 U.S. a t  264. See also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 
526-27 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
81. The National Labor Relations Act $ 14(b), 29 U.S.C. $ 164(b) (1976), allows the 
states to prohibit union shops. For a discussion of the interaction of NLRA $ 14(b) and 9 
152 of the Railway Labor Act, see Comment, The Regulation of Union Political Activity: 
Majority and Minority Rights and Remedies, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 386, 416-20 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Majority and Minority Rights]. 
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which is constitutionally permissible is not necessarily constitu- 
tionally mandated, it is the interaction of section 610, section 
152, and Abood that must be reconciled in section 441b 
decisions. 
In the instant case, the district court found that the NEA's 
reverse checkoff procedure violated section 441 b(b) (3) (A) of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act. The Act states that it shall be 
unlawful for a union "to make a contribution or expenditure by 
utilizing . . . dues, fees, or other moneys required as a condition 
of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of em- 
pl~yrnent ."~~ The court enjoined the further use of the reverse 
political checkoff as per se illegalBs "because it . . . requires the 
dissenter to act to prevent a contribution rather than requiring 
his affirmative assent to make 
The court, relying heavily on Pipefitters Local 562 v. 
United States and United States v. Boyle, decided that a 
" 'knowing free-choice' " contribution could only be made under 
" 'circumstances plainly indicating donations are for political 
purposes.' The reverse checkoff did not comply with this con- 
dition, nor according to B~yle ,~ '  would a refund of the contribu- 
tion adequately protect dissenters' rights. The court further jus- 
tified its finding that the political checkoff was an involuntary 
contribution by the fact that the NEA had a ninety-one percent 
contribution rate. This raised an inference that the members 
contributed in ign~rance.'~ Consequently, the burden of ascer- 
82. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(3)(A) (1976). 
83. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102, 1110 
(D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1077 (D.c. Cir. Jan. 22, 1979). 
84. Id. a t  1106. Local affiliates of the NEA do not have to adopt the checkoff and 
may allow dues to be paid by check or in cash. Members paying in cash or by check do 
not have to make the contribution. Id. a t  1104. 
FEC regulations now prohibit the political use of "fees or monies paid as a condition 
of acquiring or retaining membership or employment . . . even though . . . refundable 
upon request of the payor." 11 C.F.R. 114.5(a)(l) (1977). 
85. 457 F. Supp. a t  1105 (quoting Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 
385, 414 (1972)). 
86. The Boyle court rejected "contracting in" and "contracting out" as a less restric- 
tive alternative. 
87. Apparently no member was forced to submit to the checkoff, and of those mem- 
bers who did submit during the three years in question, approximately 65,000 (only 8.5% 
of all contributors) received refunds. 457 F. Supp. a t  1108. 
The court also referred to  statistics compiled by the Kentucky NEA, which showed 
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taining that the union received only voluntary political contribu- 
tions "must be on the solicitor and not on the dissenter?"' 
The NEA relied upon both Abood and Street in support of 
its checkoff, but the court distinguished Abood and ignored 
Street.80 Because Abood did not affect the statutory regulation 
of elections, the court's inquiry was unaffected by Abood. Fur- 
thermore, in Abood the union had not maintained a separate 
union fund for political, social, or other noncollective-bargaining 
expenses, whereas in both Pipefitters and the instant case, the 
union had kept a political fund distinct from the collective-bar- 
gaining  assessment.^ The Supreme Court in Abood balanced the 
minority members' interests against the union's interests and 
supported the union; in the instant case, the court found no 
"comparable justification" for ba l an~ ing .~~  
To remedy the improper deductions by the NEA, the court 
ordered the National Education Association to refund the con- 
tributions to all nonassenting members "at no expense to them 
and with minimal effort on their part."02 The court suggested 
that the NEA provide through its magazine a postage-prepaid 
card informing members that if they did not return the cards to 
the NEA, their contributions would be refunded.03 Finally, the 
that in any three-month period in the year prior to November 1975, the Kentucky NEA 
never collected more than $5,740; after the reverse checkoff was instituted, the contribu- 
tions ranged between $18,912 and $82,081. "Such a dramatic change suggests inadequate 
information to the members that the additional amount for political contributions was 
voluntary." Id. It  should be noted that the pre-checkoff period was an off-election year, 
while the year following the implementation of the checkoff was both a congressional and 
presidential election year. 
The NEA alleged that each member was informed of the voluntary nature of the 
contribution, that the contribution was not a condition of membership, and that each 
member was told how to request a refund. Brief for Appellant at 12, Federal Election 
Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 
79-1077 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 1979). 
88. 457 F. Supp. at 1109. 
89. Id. at 1107 & n.lO. 
90. The court tried to distinguish Abood on the grounds that the union there funded 
the objectionable activities out of its general fund. Since in both Pipefitters and the 
instant case, the union had a separate, segregated fund, the court found Pipefitters to 
apply. The court did not attempt to explain why Boyle would then apply to the instant 
case, since in Boyle the union had a "separate" fund but contributed general union funds 
to the political fund. United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 1076 (1973). 
91. 457 F. Supp. at 1107. 
92. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, [I9781 771 GOV'T EMPL. REL. 
REP. (BNA) 46, 51 (D.D.C. 1978). 
93. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 99 L.R.R.M. 3463, 3463 
(D.D.C. 1978). 
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NEA was enjoined from using the reverse checkoff to fund its 
political a~tivities?~ 
The enjoining of a reverse political fund checkoff by which a 
union is engaged in neither criminal misconduct nor overt coer- 
cion is unprecedented. The repercussions of the NEA decision 
will affect labor's ability to fund its political activities, and be- 
cause of the inherently political nature of public sector collective 
bargaining, public sector labor unions will be particularly af- 
fected. In analyzing the NEA case, this Note will discuss three 
main areas. First, this Note will examine the statutory interpre- 
tation that should be given section 441b in light of section 610 
and section 152. Second, it will analyze some of the constitu- 
tional implications arising from the trade-off between traditional 
union political activities and the rights of union members. Fi- 
nally, this Note will consider NEA in terms of union security 
and public sector labor policy. 
A. Statutory Standards for Section 441b 
Section 441b contains two subsections of importance to the 
instant case: 441b(a) and 441b(b)(3)(A). Subsection 441(a) pro- 
hibits union and corporate expenditures in connection with any 
federal election. With the exception of one additional phrase , 
and an additional word, section 441b(a) is identical to section 
610. Subsection 441b(b)(3)(A) prohibits establishing a separate, 
segregated union political fund using "dues, fees, or other mon- 
eys required as a condition of membership in a labor organiza- 
tion or as a condition of empl~yment ."~~ This language, though 
not identical, is strikingly similar to section 152 (Eleventh) (b)? 
The language of section 441b affirms the Court's assertion 
in Pipefitters that the Federal Election Campaign Act merely 
codified prior law." The first inquiry in analyzing the NEA deci- 
sion is whether section 441b, interpreted in light of section 610, 
actually prohibits unions from using a reverse checkoff to fund 
political activities; the second inquiry is whether section 152 
94. 457 F. Supp. at 1112. 
95. 2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(3)(A) (1976). 
96. 45 U.S.C. $ 152 (Eleventh) (1976). 
97. 407 U.S. at 399. The two Pipefitters requirements were codified at 2 U.S.C. $ 
441b(b)(WB), (C). 
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(Eleventh) affects the interpretation of section 441b. 
1. Relationship of 610 to 441 b: "Knowing free-choice" 
Pipefitters set the section 610 standard for unions raising 
political funds: (1) the member must receive notice of the politi- 
cal nature of his contribution, and (2) the member may decline 
to contribute without jeopardizing his union membership." The 
NEA case requires a "knowing free-choice." Of course, union 
members who must affirmatively assert their willingness to con- 
tribute make a knowing free-choice, but that is not the issue in 
this case. The real question is whether union members subject to 
a checkoff can also make a knowing free-choice. The district 
court was not free to re-create federal labor policy. 
Although Pipefitters effectively requires notice to employ- 
ees concerning the nature of the fund, neither section 152 (Elev- 
enth) nor the Street opinion explicitly mentions giving such no- 
tice to the employee in the reverse checkoff situation. Such a 
right may nevertheless be inferred from the fact that prohibiting 
the union from using an employee's dues for .political purposes 
over his objection would be a hollow right if the employee was 
never apprised of how his money was being used? 
It is not clear whether the NEA's reverse checkoff meets the 
second Pipefitters criterion, that a member may decline to con- 
tribute without jeopardizing his union membership. On this par- 
ticular point the facts of Pipefitters and Boyle provide no direc- 
tion because neither case involved a fact situation similar to that 
of the instant case. In Pipefitters, union members contributed to 
the political fund "in the same sense that they paid their dues or 
other financial obligations,"loO and the union made no attempt 
to dissuade union members from thinking the contributions 
were compulsory.101 In Boyle, the UMW, through subterfuge, 
funded candidates directly out of general union funds-funds 
required as a condition of membership.lo2 
Nevertheless, in one sense the Abood holding satisfies Pipe- 
fitters because the union member may obtain a refund of his 
contribution without specifying his objections, much less losing 
98. 407 U.S. at 414-15. 
99. Section 152 (Eleventh) (b) requires a written assignment that is revocable after 
one year or after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 
100. 407 U.S. at 393. 
101. Id. at 395. 
102. 482 F.2d at 761. 
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his union membership or his job.lo3 In the NEA situation, for 
example, once the union membership accepted the checkoff, in- 
dividual members who did not wish to contribute had the bur- 
den of requesting the refund. Even though the political contri- 
bution was exacted, a member retained sufficient control over 
the donation to obtain a refund. In a case similar to the instant 
case but involving a state statute, a federal district court stated: 
"Inertia of a person to take a step to see to it that his money is 
not being used for political purposes does not deprive him of the 
right to take that step and cannot be logically interpreted . . . 
as coercion."lo4 Neither Pipefitters nor Boyle mentioned the 
possibility of union members obtaining a refund; therefore, 
neither provides a standard for determining what is a "knowing 
free-choice" in a reverse checkoff. In fact, individuals could not 
even bring an action under section 610, meaning that individuals 
filing a civil action for a refund would have brought it under 
either the Railway Labor Act cases or Abood.lo6 The NEA case, 
if decided under either the Street or Abood rationale, would un- 
doubtedly have been decided in favor of the National Education 
Association.lo6 
2. Relationship of 152 (Eleventh) to 441b: in pari rnateria 
The court in the instant case held that Street and Allen 
103. 431 U.S. at 235-36, 241. 
104. Kentucky Educators Pub. Affairs Council v. Kentucky Registry of Election 
Fin., No. C 77-0575 L(A), slip op. at 8 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 25, 1978). The Kentucky Educa- 
tion Association approved a reverse checkoff for dues and political contributions. How- 
ever, the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance found that the checkoff violated KY. 
REV. STAT. § 121.320(2) (1970). The Kentucky statute is similar to 441b. The court 
found that the checkoff was not coercive but determined that it might be an "assess- 
ment" under the statute. No. C 77-0575 L(A), slip op. at 8. The NEA court noted the 
Kentucky case but dismissed it stating that the unresolved issue of whether the checkoff 
was an "assessment" was "most closely analogous to the one at bar." 457 F. Supp. a t  
1107 n.11. 
105. Section 610 was a criminal statute and did not create a civil action. Cort v. Ash, 
422 U.S. 66 (1975) (shareholder derivative action against a corporation for political ex- 
penditures); McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975) (union members 
sought damages for dues used for political purposes); Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 
394 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 530 F.2d 964 (3rd Cir. 1976) (stockholder 
derivative suit). Section 441 is also a criminal statute with penalties similar to those of $ 
610. 2 U.S.C. $ 441j (1976). There is no evidence in § 441 of congressional intent to 
create a civil remedy. 
106. The court ordered a refund to all members not specifically and affirmatively 
assenting to the contribution; however, 441 provides no authorization for such relief. In 
fact, the prescribed remedy does not follow from any of the 610 cases-CIO, UAW, 
Pipefitters, or Boyle-but only from the suggestions by the concurrence in CIO and the 
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were inapposite because they dealt with the union-shop provi- 
sions of the Railway Labor Act and not the Federal Election 
Campaign Act. Such a light dismissal of Street and Allen is un- 
fortunate.lo7 Since cases may arise under both section 441b of 
title 2 and section 152 of title 45, and since the statutes contain 
almost the same phrase, under the doctrine of in pari materia, 
the similar phrases should be given similar interpretations.lo8 
If, as NEA holds, section 441b prohibits raising funds 
through a reverse checkoff, the political funds must first be cate- 
gorized as dues, fees, or effective dues or assessments, and then 
be found to be required as a condition of employment. Pipefit- 
ters gives little guidance to the instant case on what was meant 
by "dues, fees or assessment,"10s but Street's recital of the his- 
dissent in UAW. These suggestions clearly accord with the refund remedies in Street, 
Allen, and Abood. 
The NEA court presumed dissent on the part of the NEA's members and ordered 
class relief, even though no class had been certified. Part of the court's order in NEA was 
that 
defendants [NEA], in consultation with plaintiff [FEC], prepare a plan pursu- 
ant to which their members will be informed of this lawsuit and the decision of 
this Court and will be afforded the opportunity of having refunded a t  no ex- 
pense to them and with minimal effort on their part the money that has been 
deducted from their paychecks through reverse check-off. 
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, [I9781 771 GOV'T EMPL. REL. 
REP.(BNA) 51 (D.D.C. 1978). 
The $ 610 cases contribute nothing on this point, but the Railway Labor Act cases 
held that "dissent is not to be presumed," International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 
367 U.S. 740,774 (1961), which means that the court will not grant class action relief. No 
relief will be given without proof that an individual member objects. Brotherhood of Ry. 
& S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 119 (1963). Accord, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 
431 U.S. 209, 237-39 (1977). 
107. Since the language in $ 441b(b)(3)(A) was not a part of $ 610 but is similar to 
language in $ 152, the Railway Labor Act cases should be persuasive. See Politics and 
Pipefitters, supra note 20, at 955-56 (Street had a substantial impact on $ 610). See also 
Majority and Minority Rights, supra note 81, at 424 (Street remedy protects dissenters 
and meets purposes of Federal Election Campaign Act, therefore should be applied to 
National Labor Relations Act cases). 
108. See, e.g., Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 546, 551-52 (1954) 
(Congress presumed to have accepted interpretation of the previous statute in passing a 
new statute with similar language); Marks v. United States, 161 U.S. 297, 302 (1896) 
(frequent use of the same phrase in the same subject matter suggests a single meaning). 
See generally 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION $$ 51.01-.03 (1973). 
109. 407 U.S. a t  421-27. In Pipefitters, the Court interpreted the phrase to include 
"not only actual but also effective dues or assessments." Id. a t  427. The Court further 
stated that "the political contributions in issue violated $ 610 if, and only if, payments to 
the fund were actually or effectively required for employment or union membership. . . . 
[Tlhe essence of the crime in this respect is whether the method of solicitation for the 
fund was calculated to result in knowing free-choice donations." Id. a t  439. On this point 
the Court found that the allegation that general union funds were given to  the political 
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tory of section 152 states that " 'fees' meant 'initiation fees,' and 
'assessments' was intended primarily to cover the situation of a 
union which had only nominal dues."llo The refundable political 
contribution does not fit under any of these statutory terms.lll 
This conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court's interpreta- 
tion of the statute in Street and Allen. Because the Court or- 
dered a refund, even though section 152 permitted a checkoff, 
one must conclude that either the Court ignored the statute in 
providing the remedy or, more plausibly, refundable political 
contributions do not qualify as the type of dues, fees, or assess- 
ments required as a condition of employment.l12 
Even if political contributions could be classified as dues, 
fees, or assessments, they can hardly be considered a "condition 
fund supported an inference that the political "contributions" were not "knowing free- 
choice donations." Id. a t  415-16 n.28, 439 n.48. 
The NEA funds clearly did not come from general union funds; nevertheless, the 
NEA court interpreted Pipefitters' "free-choice donations" to mean "an act intentionally 
taken and not the result of inaction when confronted with an obstacle." 457 F. Supp. a t  
1109. The facts and statements in Pipefitters simply do not go as far as the NEA hold- 
ing, although the two decisions are not incompatible. 
110. 367 U.S. a t  766. 
111. In an early case dealing with § 152, the Texas Supreme Court stated, "We 
think a political assessment was not contemplated by the Congress in using the term 
'assessments' in the union shop statute, nor that the failure to pay a political assessment 
would be a valid ground for discharge." Sandsberry v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 
156 Tex. 340, 346, 295 S.W.2d 412, 416 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957). 
In NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 US. 734 (1963), the Supreme Court found 
that under the National Labor Relations Act 5 8(a)(3) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) 
(1976)), where employment is conditioned upon union membership, 
membership . . . may . . . be conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues. 
"Membership" as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial 
core. 
. . . If an employee in a union shop unit refuses to respect any union- 
imposed obligations other than the duty to pay dues and fees, and membership 
in the union is therefore denied or terminated, the condition of "membership" 
for 5 8(a)(3) purposes is nevertheless satisfied and the employee may not be 
discharged for nonmembership. 
U.S. a t  742-43. 
112. The Street Court wrote the following: 
The appellees [dissenters] . . . remain obliged, as a condition of continued em- 
loyment, to make the payments to their respective unions called for by the 
agreement. Their right of action stems not from constitutional limitations on 
Congress' power to authorize the union shop, but from 8 2 [§ 1521, Eleventh 
itself. In other words, appellees' grievance stems from the spending of their 
funds for purposes not authorized by the Act in the face of their objection, not 
from the enforcement of the union-shop agreement by the mere collection of 
their funds. If their money were used for purposes contemplated by § 2 [§ 1521, 
Eleventh, the appellees would have no grievance at all. 
U.S. at 771. 
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of employment."113 Continued employment is not founded upon 
payment to a political fund. The test for the "condition of mem- 
bership" clause should be whether failure to make the contribu- 
tion is a ground for dismissal from the union; since Street, polit- 
ical contributions have not been in this category. 
Adherence to the doctrine of in pari materia would promote 
a consistent standard for labor unions. I t  is conceivable that dis- 
senting union members could bring an action against a labor 
union under section 152 (Eleventh) and the Constitution to en- 
join the reverse checkoff. On the basis of Street and Abood, the 
court would deny the injunction.l14 Based on NEA, the same 
court would grant an injunction to the Federal Election Com- 
mission on an identical claim phrased in language identical to 
that of section 441b. NEA is clearly, but unnecessarily, a t  odds 
with Street and Abood. Consistent interpretation of section 441b 
and section 152 would avoid such an anomalous result. 
B. Constitutional Questions Affecting Union Security 
Concluding that the political checkoff is or is not statutorily 
permissible does not dispose of the substantial first amendment 
problems. The Supreme Court has formed a two-edged constitu- 
tional sword that cuts against the positions of both the Federal 
Election Commisson and the National Education Association. 
In Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson, the Court 
decided that the union-shop provision, which compels associa- 
tion for certain activities related to collective bargaining, did not 
violate freedom of as~ociaton.~~Westricting the parameters of 
the Hanson decision, the Court in Street and Abood prohibited 
the funding of activities outside the scope of collective bargain- 
ing to the extent of an objecting employee's contribution.l16 Dis- 
113. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at  742-43. In Barber v. Gibbons, 
367 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mo. 1973), the union required a contribution from each member, 
but the member could authorize the union to place the contribution in the political fund 
instead of the general union fund. The court found the contribution was a condition of 
membership in violation of $ 610. 
114. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at  237-41; International Ass'n of Ma- 
chinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at  771-72. The Court stated in Street, "We also think that a 
blanket injunction against all expenditures of funds for the disputed purposes, even one 
conditioned on cessation of improper expenditures, would not be a proper exercise of 
equitable discretion." Id. at 772. 
115. 351 U.S. at  238. 
116. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at  237; International Ass'n of Machin- 
ists v. Street, 367 U.S. at  768-70. 
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senters may be excused from participating in union political ac- 
tivities by merely manifesting their objection to the union's 
expenditures.'17 Thus the Court fashioned. a presumption in 
favor of union political affiliation118 that the dissenter has the 
power to overcome.11s 
The trend following Street and Abood has been to create a 
right not to associate.laO For example, the result in the instant 
case would be consistent with such a theory.121 In light of the 
established right of association, the recognition of a right of 
nonassociation would ensure that the government could not pro- 
hibit association or nonassociation except upon a showing of a 
compelling state interest.la2 
The argument for a right not to associate, however, would 
effectively stand Street and Abood on their heads, since the pre- 
sumption granted unions in those cases would be reversed. In 
Street and Abood, the Court permitted a presumption favoring 
majority political activity that the dissenting member must 
overcome, whereas in NEA, the court created a presumption 
favoring the would-be dissenter that the majority must over- 
come. In either case, one party or the other must make an af- 
117. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 118 (1963). 
118. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court said, "[Tlhere is no longer 
any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly 
group activity. Thus we have affirmed the right 'to engage in association for the advance- 
ment of beliefs and ideas.' " Id. a t  430 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). 
119. The burden of proof is on the union to show that dues are spent for permissible 
purposes, but the employee has a duty to continue to pay dues pending that determin- 
tion. Browne v. Milwaukee Bd. of School Directors, 83 Wis. 2d 316, 340-340b, 265 N.W. 
2d 559, 570-71 (1978). 
120. See, e.g., Jensen v. Farrell Line, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Good v. 
Associated Students of Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash. 2d 94, 101-02, 542 P.2d 762,766 (1975). 
See also Note, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 633, 646 (1978). 
121. This philosophy is evident in the district court's subsequent order to the NEA. 
The NEA proposed an insert for an issue of its magazine, Today's Education, which is 
sent to each NEA member. Any members desiring refunds of their contributions made 
during the previous three years would mail a postage-prepaid card. Both the FEC and 
the National Right to Work Committee protested that this proposal would only perpetu- 
ate the reverse checkoff. The court agreed and ordered the NEA to provide a postage- 
prepaid card that members who did not want to refund could return. Any members not 
mailing the card would automatically receive a refund of $1.00 for each year they con- 
tributed. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 99 L.R.R.M. 3463 (D.D.C. 
1978). 
122. Compare NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430, 438 (1963) (only compelling 
state interest can limit right to associate for political purposes), with Abood v. Detroit 
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 264 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (overriding governmental 
interest required to compel minority political association). 
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firmative showing. The individual's burden of assenting to, or 
dissenting from, a contribution does not seem significantly 
heavier in either case. In light of the more established right of 
association and the voluntary nature of the National Education 
Association, the presumption in favor of the union presents the 
more reasonable approach. Nonetheless, the NEA result remains 
inconsistent with the Street and Abood Supreme Court 
decisions.las 
The Court recently recognized that corporations possess a 
first amendment right of speech;lu unions will likely claim the 
same right? If indeed unions possess that right, the decision in 
the instant case makes the NEA's rights of association and free 
speech of negligible import unless the membership can take col- 
lective action even though an individual member dissents. Dem- 
ocratic tradition seeks to protect the minority while giving effi- 
cacy to majority decisions. The Court's acknowledgement that 
contributions serve to affiliate the individual contributor with 
123. See also United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). "Unions too most often 
operate under the electoral process and the principle of majority rule. Nor . . . does it 
seem reasonable to presume dissent from mere absence of explicit assent, especially in 
view of long-established union practice." Id. at  149 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
124. "We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the 
decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within 
the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is 
a corporation . . . ." First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978). Nevertheless, 
this first amendment right may be very limited as indicated by the Bellotti Court's sug- 
gestion that the government interest in preventing corruption of the political process 
might sustain 5 441b against a a t  amendment challenge. Id. at  787 n.26. The dissent in 
Bellotti stated that the Court had only "reserve[d] the formal interment of the Corrupt 
Practices Act [§ 441bI and similar state statutes for another day." Id. at  821 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
125. See id. at  777. See also Politics and Pipefitters, supra note 20, at  980-82. 
Affording unions first amendment rights creates an additional dilemma in the NEA, 
or even Abood, situation: What or who constitutes the union? If it is the entire member- 
ship, then the NEA decision may burden the political decision-making process and chill 
the union's first amendment rights. On the other hand, if it is only the majority, then the 
practice of exclusive representation should be abandoned and minority unions be al- 
lowed. See Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights in 
Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 1004, 1010-11, 1025 (1970). 
The NEA and other unions might argue that since political speech is protected, 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 
(1964), a union's political speech should be given greater protection than its collective- 
bargaining activities. Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate 
and Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 148, 154 
(1974). 
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the cause or candidatelB6 was complemented by the decision in 
Street to give individuals the power to disafltliate themselves by 
requesting a refund. The instant case gives complete effect to 
the minority's viewpoint at the expense of the majority's rights 
of association and speech.127 On the other hand, allowing the 
checkoff in the tradition of Street, Allen, and Abood would give 
effect to majority decisions to fund political activities while pro- 
tecting the minority's right to refuse financial or moral support 
for the union's political stance. 
The constitutional questions raised here lend themselves 
well to a balancing approach. Since in Abood the Court found 
that the agency shop did not infringe on the minority's first 
amendment rights, the prohibition of a reverse political checkoff 
runs the risk of offending the majority's right of association. The 
Court has consistently suggested the refund mechanism as a 
means of protecting the minority while not significantly burden- 
ing majority decisions.lm Because no one is compelled to join the 
NEA and because a member may withdraw from the Association 
at any time, adopting the Street and Abood refund would strike 
a particularly appropriate balance in the instant case.12@ To 
eliminate the reverse checkoff would swing the constitutional 
pendulum away from the right of association toward a right of 
nonassociation where a single dissenter can veto the time- 
honored principle of majority rule. 
126. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976). See Cullen v. New York State Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 546, 551 (E.D.N.Y 1977). But cf. Wright, Politics and the 
Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005 (1976) (nothing commits us to 
the dogma that money is speech). 
127. Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union 
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 148, 154 (1974). 
128. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 240 & n.41 (1977); Brotherhood of 
Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v. 
Street, 367 U.S. 740,774-75 (1961); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 597 n.1 (1957) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 149 (1948) (Rutledge, J., 
concurring). 
129. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978), where Justice 
Powell suggested that a critical factor in determining minority first amendment rights is 
the voluntary or involuntary nature of the association. His opinion can be read to suggest 
that in a voluntary union, the minority might not even have a refund remedy against the 
union; instead, the minority's only remedy might be to withdraw. Justice White dis- 
agreed that dissenting members or stockholders should have to withdraw and cited to 
Street and Abood as demonstrating the way the Court has protected minority interests. 
Id. a t  813-14 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, according to the dicta in Bellotti, dissenters 
in voluntary unions either have no remedy (Justice Powell) or must resort to the Street 
refund (Justice White). 
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C. Federal Labor Policy Considerations 
1. Purposes of the agency shop: collective bargaining and the 
"free-rider " 
The political activities of private sector unions generally 
have a less direct impact on bargaining activities than do those 
of public sector unions. In the public sector, the very nature of 
the employer makes public sector labor relations a political pro- 
c e s ~ . ~ ~ ~  Not only does a checkoff provision preserve union 
financial security and bargaining,lJ1 but where the public union 
bargains with and lobbies to the same party, the line between 
collective bargaining for present agreements and politicking for 
future agreements becomes hazy.lJ2 While the NEA principle 
will burden union activities in both the public and the private 
sector, the greatest incidence of the burden will be felt in the 
public sector.1Jg In contrast to NEA, the Street and Abood deci- 
sions would give greater effect to legislation seeking parity for 
labor in collective bargaining. 
While the FEC's and the district court's concern for the 
rights of dissenting union members can be appreciated, the NEA 
decision straps the NEA with a free-rider problem affecting the 
lobbying activities of the union. By enjoining the use of reverse 
130. "'The uniqueness of public employment is not in the employees nor in the 
work performed; the uniqueness is in the special character of the employer.' " Abood v. 
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 230 (quoting Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: 
Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 669,670 (1975)) (empha- 
sis in original). 
131. See Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights 
in Public Employment, 55 CORNELL . REV. 1004, 1010 (1970). See also D. SULLIVAN, 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LABOR LAW g 16.6 (1969); Nolan, Public Sector Collective Bargain- 
ing: Defining the Federal Role, 63 CORNELL . REV. 419, 456-57 (1978) (union security 
and disciplinary measures contravene the merit principle). 
132. Cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) (difficult to draw 
lines in the public sector between activities related and unrelated to collective bargain- 
ing); Havas v. Communications Workers of America, 454 F. Supp. 305,308 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 
1978) (categorizing union activities as collective bargaining is a matter of degree); Jensen 
v. Yonamine, 437 F. Supp. 368, 376 (D. Hawaii 1977) (difficult to distinguish between 
collective-bargaining activities and political activities). 
133. One commentator has written the following: 
If the first amendment is construed to prohibit public employee unions from 
expending, over an employee's objection, money collected under union security 
agreements to finance lobbying and other similar activities aimed a t  promoting 
decisions on such "political" matters favorable to their bargaining demands, 
the unions' ability to achieve their demands when collective bargaining actu- 
ally occurs would be severely limited. 
Blair, Union Security Agreements in Public Employment, 60 CORNELL . REV. 183, 195 
(1975). 
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checkoff and by requiring affirmative proof of the intent to do- 
nate, any NEA member may do nothing and receive all the ben- 
efits of the NEA's political activities, which will undoubtedly 
sufFer.lS4 Although a union's free-rider problem would not be 
completely eliminated so long as a member could object and get 
a rebate, not presuming dissent would at least keep the burden 
on the employee. Under the Street rule, the cost to an employee 
of being a free-rider is the time and effort required to dissent;ls5 
under NEA, there is no cost or burden to being a free-rider. The 
NEA requirement may actually place a greater burden on the 
employee who wishes to contribute, since the employee must af- 
firmatively assert himself in favor of each expenditure in order 
to donate to the political fund;lS6 under Allen, objections to po- 
litical expenditures of any kind need only be made once. 
In the NEA context, where NEA membership is voluntary, 
teachers considering joining the NEA will weigh the costs of 
membership against the perceived benefits. One cost will be the 
cost of the union's political activities that the NEA member will 
bear regardless of whether he makes a de minimus financial con- 
tribution. If the costs, ideological or financial, are greater than 
the benefits of membership, the teacher will not join; therefore, 
political affiliation becomes part of the cost of membership.lS7 
2. Alternatives to rebate 
The Supreme Court has placed great emphasis on allowing 
134. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102,1107- 
20 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1077 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22,1979); Comment, The 
Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions 
and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 148,159 n.62 (1974). But see Majority and Minor- 
ity Rights, supra note 81, at 409 (size of voluntary political funds suggests that members 
do support their union's political endeavors). 
In a case analogous to the instant case, it was suggested that rather than offer a 
rebate to dissenters, it might actually be more economical and less troublesome to strike 
the procedure and request voluntary contributions. Anderson v. City of Boston, 78 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 2297, 2320 n.20, 380 N.E. 2d 628, 640 n.20 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 
lOs0 (1979). 
135. It might be argued, however, that the payroll deduction deprives dissenting 
employees of the interest on contributions they will ultimately have refunded. While the 
interest on the $1.00 NEA deduction would be de minimus to any individual, in the 
aggregate the union clearly benefits. The court in the instant case did not order the NEA 
to refund the contributions with interest. 
136. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 198 (1977). 
137. This argument is not as viable in an agency- or union-shop case, such as Abood, 
but is peculiar to a voluntary labor organization such as the NEA or, perhaps, a corpora- 
tion. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978). 
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the unions to seek an internal remedy,lS8 including a rebate. A 
rebate, however, is not the only remedy. The rebate procedure 
has a certain "one person, one vote" flair to it, but is is hardly 
consistent with democratic sportsmanship for players to be able 
to withdraw from the game after losing the toss. Ideally, dissent- 
ers would work within the union to gain a representative vote. 
Challenging the politics of the leaders and voicing objections to 
the use of political funds might be more effective when done 
within the union than if carried on by the innocuous protest of a 
rebate?@ Some unions have allowed dissenters to contract out of 
political activities.140 Finally, one commentator suggests that in 
an agency-shop situation, nonunion members paying fees should 
be presumed to object to the political contribution, while those 
who are union members should be presumed to approve of the 
deduction. The fee payers may aftirmatively assent to a dona- 
tion, and the union members may affirmatively dissent from the 
deduction.141 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Federal Election Commission v. National Education Asso- 
ciation is a vexing case in which there are many competing in- 
terests at stake-individual and collective, statutory and consti- 
tutional, and economic and political. The district court opinion 
shows a concern for the individual union members that no other 
court has shown when weighing individual rights against union 
interests and rights. Although the court followed the unclear 
standards of Pipefitters, it misconceived the effect of the Rail- 
way Labor Act cases on section 441b of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act and ignored competing constitutional interests as 
well as national labor policy. On the basis of Street, Pipefitters, 
138. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 242 (1977); Brotherhood of Ry. & 
S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113,122 (1963). But see Beck v. Communications Workers 
of America, No. B-76-839 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 1979) (court refused to stay procedures pend- 
ing union attempts to solve internal problems). 
139. See Majority and Minority Rights, supra note 81, at 411. 
140. See Gabauer v. Woodcock, 594 F.2d 662, 668 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
100 S.Ct 80 (1979); Majority and Minority Rights, supra note 81, at 416 (citing Seay v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 371 F. Supp. 754, aff'd in part and reu'd in part, 533 F.2d 
1126 (9th Cir. 1976)). 
141. Merrill, Limitations Upon the Use of Compulsory Union Dues, 42 J .  Am L. & 
COM. 711, 725-26 (1976). 
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and Abood, and absent a clear new mandate from Congress, the 
reverse political checkoff should be permitted. 
Jay S. Bybee 
